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IS 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) A FEDERAL FORUMSHOPPING STATUTE?

AbstracL In 1948, Congress enacted section 1404(a) of Tite 28 to allow transfers
between federal district courts. Congress intended the statute to promote convenience in
the federal courts. The statute does not specify which state's law applies following a transfer, but in 1964, in Van Dusen v. Barrack, the Supreme Court determined that the state
law of the transferor court must apply following defendant-initiated transfers. The Van
Dusen Court reasoned that application of the statute should promote convenience and
uniformity and discourage forum-shopping in the federal courts. In 1990, in Ferens v.
John Deere Co., the Supreme Court held that the state law of the transferor court must
apply following all section 1404(a) transfers. The Ferens Court purported to base its decision on Van Dusen's rationale and other considerations. The Ferens holding, however,
violates these principles. This Comment analyzes the historical development of section
1404(a) and the Ferens decision, and proposes an application of the statute that increases
both uniform application of state law and convenience in the federal courts.

In 1948, Congress enacted the federal change of venue statute.'
When a case is brought in a United States district court with proper,
but not necessarily convenient venue, the statute allows the court to
transfer the action to a more convenient district court. Congress
enacted the statute to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public
against unnecessary inconvenience, and to soften the sometimes harsh
results afforded by the doctrine of forum non conveniens.2
Although the statute seems complete on its face, it fails to address
which state's law applies after a district court transfers an action to a
district court in another state.3 In Ferens v. John Deere Co.,4 the
United States Supreme Court addressed this issue and held that the
state law of the transferor court governs all actions transferred under
section 1404(a). 5 The Ferens Court, however, failed to reconcile its
ruling with the reasoning of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,6 and Van Dusen v.
Barrack7 In Erie, the Court sought to encourage the uniform application of law in federal and state courts sitting in the same state.8 In
Van Dusen, the Court determined that the prohibition of forum-shopping was a logical extension of Erie's goal of uniformity.9 Ferens,
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1976) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.").
2. See, eag., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
3. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a); see also supra note 1.
4. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
5. Id. at 1277.
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
8. See 304 U.S. at 74; see also infra note 17.
9. 376 U.S. at 636-37; see also infra note 40.
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however, encourages manipulative plaintiffs to forum-shop and undermines the uniform application of state law by state and federal courts
within each state.
This Comment discusses Erie, Erie's progeny, section 1404(a), and
Supreme Court cases addressing which state's law applies following a
section 1404(a) transfer. It examines the basic conflict that exists
between the Court's desire for uniformity and the Ferens Court's interpretation of section 1404(a). It sets forth section 1404(a)'s legislative
history and judicial interpretations and proposes the "proper" application of the statute in light of this background. The Comment advocates a rule that applies the law of the transferor court to defendantinitiated and sua sponte transfers, and the law of the transferee court
to plaintiff-initiated transfers. It then suggests possible methods of
putting this suggested rule into practice.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
SECTION 1404(a) AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
GOAL OF UNIFORMITY

A.

The Erie Doctrine and Choice of Law

1.

The Origin of the Erie Doctrine

In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, " the Supreme Court found that in diversity actions, federal courts must apply state law unless the Constitution or a federal statute or treaty governs the action. 1 In reaching its
decision, the Erie Court expressly overruled the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson.1 2 Swift stated that, in diversity cases where no state statute
governed the matter, federal courts were free to exercise independent
judgment as to what the common law of the state was or should be.' 3
The Erie Court concluded that Swift hindered uniform application of
law among federal courts as well as between the federal and state systems. 4 This lack of uniformity prevented courts from equitably
administering state law. 5
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11. Id. at 78. The Court, however, did not reach the issue of which state's law controls an
action that is transferred to a new venue. See Erie, 304 U.S. 64. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.2, at 194 (1985) (discussing Erie) [hereinafter
CIVIL PROCEDURE].

12. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see also 304 U.S. at 79-80.

13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
14. 304 U.S. at 74.
15. Id. at 75.

Choice of Law Following Transfer
2. Choice of Law after Erie
Although the Erie Court concluded that federal courts could not
disregard state common law, the Court failed to explain why Pennsylvania law, as opposed to New York law, governed the action.16
Three years after Erie, however, the Supreme Court resolved a choice
of law issue by underscoring the importance of the Erie Court's goal of
uniformity. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,1 7 the Supreme
Court stated that federal courts must apply the choice of law rules of
the states in which they sit." The Court reasoned that if federal
courts had discretion to decide choice of law issues in diversity
actions, plaintiffs could use the "accident of diversity of citizenship" to
obtain decisions in federal courts that were unobtainable in state
courts of the same state. 9 The Court noted that this would undermine Erie's goal of uniformity within each state.2"
.

The Federal Change of Venue Statute-28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Before section 1404(a) 2 ' was enacted in 1948, parties faced with
suits in inconvenient district courts had only one option: a motion for
dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.22 Under that
doctrine, courts with jurisdiction over an action could dismiss the suit
if a more convenient forum in which to litigate the action existed.2 3
This provision for outright dismissal sometimes yielded harsh and
inefficient results.24 Plaintiffs were not always able to sue in the "more
convenient" forum because that state's statute of limitations had
run.2 Even when plaintiffs were not time-barred, they were forced to
file a new action in the more convenient forum.
16. See 304 U.S. 64; see also supra note 11.
17. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Since Klaxon, the Supreme Co.rt has repeatedly underscored the
importance of Erie's goal of uniformity. See, g. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945). Guaranty Trust concluded that Erie'sprimary purpose was to avoid the situation where
state and federal courts within the same state reach substantially different results on the same
issues. Id.; see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1958).
18. 313 U.S. at 496.
19. Id.
20. Id
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1976); see also supra note 1.
22. See, eg. Brown v. Wooding, 174 F. Supp. 640, 643 (D.C. Pa. 1959).
23. See, eg., Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1029 (3d Cir. 1980).
24. See, e-g., Glicken v. Bradford, 204 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D.C.N.Y. 1962).
25. See, eg., Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600, 602 (D.C.N.Y. 1966). Some courts,
however, conditioned the dismissal of a suit under forum non conveniens on the moving party's
agreement not to challenge the suit on statute of limitations grounds in the new forum. See
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, § 2.17, at 90 n.17.
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In 1948, Congress enacted section 1404(a) to increase convenience
in the federal courts by eliminating the inequities presented by the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.2 6 Section 1404(a) allows federal
courts to transfer suits among federal districts rather than dismissing
the suits outright.2 7 Courts sua sponte, or parties by motion, may
transfer actions to serve convenience and justice if the action could
have originally been brought in the transferee forum.28
Although courts agree that Congress intended section 1404(a) to
make venue more convenient in diversity actions,2 9 neither the statute
nor its legislative history indicates which state's law applies after a
transfer. ° Thus, courts have been forced to determine which state's
law applies following a transfer.
C.

Choice of Law Following a Defendant-InitiatedSection 1404(a)
Transfer: Van Dusen v. Barrack and its Aftermath

1.

Van Dusen v. Barrack

In Van Dusen v. Barrack,3 ' the Supreme Court decided which
state's law applies following a defendant-initiated transfer under section 1404(a). The Van Dusen Court held that when a defendant initiates a transfer under section 1404(a), the transferee court must apply
the law of the state in which the transferor court sits. 3 2 The decision
attempted to reconcile section 1404(a) choice of law issues in defendant-initiated transfers with the statute's goal of increasing conven26. See CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.17, supra note 11, at 90.
27. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1976); see also supra note 1.
28. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a); see also supra note 1. Courts typically base their decisions to
transfer on several factors, including ease of access to sources of proof, see, eg., Radio Santa Fe,
Inc. v. Sena, 687 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Tex. 1988); the witnesses' location, see, e.g., Supco
Automotive Parts, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Spring Co., 538 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
the state where the cause of action arose, see, e.g., Grossman v. Schwarz, 678 F. Supp. 440, 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); a court's familiarity with the applicable state law, see, eg., Lozano v. Civiletti,
89 F.R.D. 475, 480 (D.D.C. 1980); and the plaintiff's right to choose a forum, see, eg., Young v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 399, 401 (N.D. Tex. 1984). But see Miller v. Cohen,
No. HAR-90-1427 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 1991) (plaintiff has primary right to choose a forum but that
choice is entitled to less deference where there is little connecting the forum to the cause of
action). Courts attempt to maximize convenience for all involved in the action. See, eg.,
Kirschner Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Pannill, 697 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Del. 1988).
29. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
30. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a); see also supra note 1.
31. 376 U.S. 612.
32. Id. at 639.

Choice of Law Following Transfer

ience,3 3 the policy of discouraging forum-shopping, 34 and Erie's goal
of increased uniformity. 5
First, the Van Dusen Court underscored the fact that section
1404(a) was enacted to increase convenience of parties and witnesses
in the federal courts, by providing a mechanism for transfer to more
convenient courtrooms.36 The Court determined that to satisfy the
purposes of the statute, when a defendant initiates a transfer under
section 1404(a), the law of the transferor court's state must follow the
defendant to the transferee forum. 37 Applying the law of the transferee court's state would decrease convenience, because courts would
be reluctant to grant a transfer where the plaintiff's claim could be
prejudiced by the new law.3"
Second, the Van Dusen Court implied that the application of section
1404(a) should not increase forum-shopping. 39 The Court concluded
that if the law of the transferee court was applied following a defendant-initiated transfer, the statute could be used by defendants as a
forum-shopping instrument. 4°
Finally, the Van Dusen Court stated that its holding fully conformed with Erie's goal of the uniform application of state law. 4 ' Van
Dusen concluded that the goal of uniformity was grounded in a desire
to "ensure that the 'accident' of federal diversity jurisdiction does not
enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court
which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where
the action was ffled." 42 The Court determined that if the state law of
the transferee court were applied in defendant-initiated transfers,
diverse defendants could obtain changes in the law that would be
33. Id. at 635-37.
34. Id at 636.
35. Id at 637.
36. See id The Court recognized that increased judicial efficiency was an additional purpose
of section 1404(a). Id at 616.
37. Ia at 635-36.
38. See id at 636.
39. Id The Supreme Court has determined that Erie's policy of uniformity is intertwined
with the avoidance of forum-shopping. See id at 638-39; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 467-68 (1965). The Hanna Court concluded that the Erie decision was "in part a reaction
to the practice of 'forum shopping' "that had arisen after Swift v. Tyson, and "is rooted in part in
a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ
because the suit had been brought in a federal [as opposed to state] court." Id at 467; see also
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1285 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stewart Org., Inc.
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39 (1988) (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
40. 376 U.S. at 636.
41. Id. at 637; see also supra note 17.
42. 376 U.S. at 638.

855

Washington Law Review

Vol. 66:851, 1991

unavailable to non-diverse defendants,4 3 and thereby undermine Erie's
goal of uniformity. Consequently, the Van Dusen Court held that the
transferee court should apply the law of the transferor state following
a defendant-initiated transfer.'
2.

The Aftermath of Van Dusen

Although the Van Dusen Court unequivocally restricted its holding
to defendant-initiated transfers,4 5 several federal courts applied the
holding following both plaintiff- and defendant-initiated transfers.'
These courts, therefore, determined that the state law of the transferor
court must apply after any section 1404(a) transfer. The alternative
view, however, was that Van Dusen's express limitation of its holding
to defendant-initiated transfers illustrated the fact that courts must
deal with plaintiff-initiated transfers differently.4 7 Recently, in Ferens
v. John Deere Co.,4 8 the Supreme Court extended Van Dusen's application of section 1404(a) to plaintiff-initiated transfers.4 9
D. The "New" Rule Governing Whose Law Applies After a
Transfer: Ferens v. John Deere Co.
In March of 1990, the Supreme Court held in Ferens v. John Deere
Co. that the state law of the transferor court applies following all section 1404(a) transfers.5" In Ferens, the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, lost his hand after catching it in a harvester manufactured by the
defendant, a Delaware corporation.5 1 The plaintiff filed a breach of
warranty suit against the defendant in Pennsylvania district court
based on diversity jurisdiction.5 2 Because Pennsylvania's two-year
43. Id
44. Id. at 639-40.
45. Id.
46. See, eg., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 306 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S.
1006 (1989); Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enter., Inc., 802 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 15
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3846, at 367
(1986).
47. See, e.g., Ferens v. Deere & Co., 862 F.2d 31, 35-36 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S.Ct. 1274
(1990); see also 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4506, at 79 (1982) (stating that the principal concern in determining section
1404(a) choice of law questions should be with preventing the use of the transfer statute as a
forum-shopping

instrument);

AMERICAN

LAW

INST.,

STUDY

OF THE

DIVISION

OF

JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1306(c) (1969).
48. 110 S.Ct. 1274 (1990). Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority in
Ferens.
49. Id. at 1277.
50. Id. at 1280.
51. Id. at 1277.
52. Id.

Choice of Law Following Transfer
statute of limitations on tort claims had run, the plaintiff filed his negligence claim in a Mississippi district court, where the applicable statute of limitations was six years.53 The plaintiffs then moved to transfer
the Mississippi action to Pennsylvania under section 1404(a) for the
sake of convenience.' The suit's only connection to Mississippi was
that the defendant did business there." The district court transferred
the suit to Pennsylvania, where it was consolidated with the plaintiffs'
breach of warranty action. 6 The issue presented to the Supreme
Court was whether the Mississippi or Pennsylvania statute of limitations governed the negligence claim.
1.

The Majority Opinion in Ferens

The Ferens majority held that a transferee court must apply the
state law of the transferor court regardless of who initiates the transfer." Ferens purported to base its holding on the rationale underlying
the Van Dusen decision and "other considerations.""8 Specifically, the
Ferens Court found that Van Dusen mandated that choice of law
under section 1404(a) must serve Erie's goal of uniformity, 5 9 counter
forum-shopping, 60 and ensure that section 1404(a) transfer decisions
serve convenience rather than fears of prejudice to the parties. 61 The
Ferens Court added the requirement that a section 1404(a) choice of
law rule serve the administration of justice.62
The FerensCourt determined that applying the law of the transferor
state following a plaintiff-initiated transfer was consistent with Erie's
desire for uniformity between the state and federal courts within each
state.63 Ferensinterpreted Erie to require that section 1404(a) not be
53. Id at 1278. Mississippi had jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation by virtue of the
fact that the company was a corporate resident of the state. Id
54. Id

55. Id
56. Id The district court dismissed the negligence claim, ruling that Pennsylvania law
applied and that the state's two-year statute of limitations had run. Id Ferens v. Deere & Co.,
639 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 862 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S.Ct.
1274 (1990). The district court reasoned that the "interest of justice" would not be served if
plaintiffs were allowed to forum-shop for a favorable limitations period. Id The Third Circuit
upheld the dismissal, Ferens v. Deere & Co., 862 F.2d 31, 36 (3rd. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1274 (1990), and the plaintiffs appealed. See 110 S.Ct. at 1278.

57. 110 S. Ct. at 1280.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id

at
at
at
at
at

1280-81.
1280, 1281-82.
1282-83.
1283-84.
1280-81; see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 637 (1964).
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used to deprive parties of available state law advantages." The Court
reasoned that applying the state law of the transferee forum would
deprive plaintiffs of the benefits of the transferor state's law. 6 5 Furthermore, the majority found that applying the transferee state's law
would seriously undermine Erie's goal of uniformity by changing the
applicable state law after a transfer.6 6
The Ferens majority also concluded that applying the transferor
state's law to plaintiff-initiated transfers did not violate Van Dusen's
goal of preventing forum-shopping, because plaintiffs already have the
power to forum-shop prior to bringing suit by virtue of the venue privilege. 67 The Court reasoned, therefore, that applying the law of the
transferor state did not offer plaintiffs any forum-shopping opportunities that were not already available under the Van Dusen rationale.68
The Ferens majority also based its holding on a determination that
section 1404(a)'s legislative and judicial histories compel the conclusion that the statute was enacted to increase the parties' convenience
rather than to inhibit the plaintiff's ability to exercise his or her venue
privilege. 69 The Court reasoned that if the transferee state's law were
applied to plaintiff-initiated transfers, plaintiffs considering transfer
would have to balance concerns of convenience against the prospect of
losing the transferor court's favorable law.7" This balancing of concerns was unacceptable, the Court found, because section 1404(a)
transfers should be based on increased convenience for all of the parties rather than on potential changes in the law.7 1 The Ferens Court
stated that the application of the transferee state's law might discourage courts from granting transfers where there is a possibility of a
change in the law that could prejudice the defendant.7 2 The resulting
inconvenient litigation would penalize the entire system for the plaintiff's poor forum choice.73
Finally, the majority determined that, from an administrative standpoint, applying the law of the transferor court following all transfers is
64. 110 S. Ct. at 1280.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1281.
67. Id. at 1281-82; see also Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636. The Ferens majority recognized that
the plaintiffs were forum-shopping. 110 S. Ct. at 1278. Nonetheless, the Court determined that
this type of forum-shopping was irrelevant, because the plaintiffs gained no legal advantage and
could have brought suit in Mississippi regardless of the transfer. Id. at 1282.
68. 110 S.Ct. at 1282.
69. Id. at 1279, 1282; see also Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 635.
70. 110 S. Ct. at 1283.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id.

858

Choice of Law Following Transfer
the most practical way of determining which state's law applies.74 The
Court was concerned that a rule applying the law of the transferee
court to plaintiff-initiated transfers would cause too much uncertainty
in situations where the motion to transfer was made sua sponte, by
both the plaintiff and the defendant, or by only one of several plaintiffs.75 The Court concluded, therefore, that establishing a firm rule
prevents the type of uncertainty and confusion that could cause unnecessary litigation in the federal courts.76
2.

The Dissenting Opinion in Ferens

In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's opinion was
flawed for several reasons, two of which are relevant to this Comment.77 First, Scalia maintained that the holding converts section
1404(a) into a forum-shopping device for manipulative plaintiffs,
thereby decreasing the odds of uniformity within each state, contrary
to the reasoning of Erie, Klaxon and Van Dusen.71 Second, the dissent
asserted that the solution offered by the majority is not the most
administratively efficient method of answering the question of which
state's law applies after a transfer.79
In discussing forum-shopping, Justice Scalia claimed that the majority's concern for protecting the plaintiffs' venue privilege was misplaced, because the plaintiffs actually had two venue choices, the
temporary venue choice of Mississippi and the "actual" venue choice
of Pennsylvania. 0 Consequently, the dissent concluded that the
majority's holding allows exactly the type of manipulation of federal
diversity jurisdiction that is decried by Klaxon.II
The Ferens dissent also concluded that, contrary to the majority's
opinion, applying the state law of the transferor court will decrease
conienience in the federal courts because of increased. forum-shopping.82 The dissent predicted that the decision will cause inefficiency
and confusion in the federal courts as plaintiffs dart-in and out of vari74. Id

The Ferens Court recognized that Van Dusen did not adequately address

administrative concerns. Id
75. Id
76. Id at 1283-84.

77. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct 1274, 1286 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although
Justice Scalia did not agree with the majority's holding, he did not specify which state's law he
would have applied. 110 S. Ct. 1274.
78. Id at 1286-87. Justice Scalia characterized the goal of Erie and Klaxon as the prevention
of forum-shopping between the federal and state court systems. Id at 1285.
79. Id at 1287.
80. Id at 1286.
81. Id; see also supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
82. 110 S. Ct at 1287.
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ous forums on their way to their true choice of courtrooms.8 3 The
dissent argued that rather than furthering section 1404(a)'s goal of
increased convenience in the courts, the majority's decision will
84
destroy it.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1404(a) WITHIN THE
PARAMETERS OF VAN DUSEN AND FERENS

The Ferens Court's application of section 1404(a) is incorrect in
light of the reasoning behind Van Dusen. Ferens' decision to apply the
law of the transferor court following all section 1404(a) transfers"
threatens to convert the statute into a forum-shopping tool that will
undermine Erie's goal of the uniform application of law, contrary to
Van Dusen's rationale.8 6 As Van Dusen demonstrated, however, section 1404(a) need not conflict with the policies underlying Erie. Had
the Ferens Court properly applied Van Dusen's reasoning, the Court
could have interpreted the statute so as to increase convenience in the
federal courts, but not decrease uniformity. This Comment's interpretation of the rationale underlying Van Dusen demonstrates that the
transferor court's law should be applied following court- and defendant-initiated transfers and the transferee court's law should be applied
following plaintiff-initiated transfers.87
A.

The Van Dusen-Ferens Rationale

After Ferens and Van Dusen, choice of law rules under section
1404(a) must meet four important criteria. The Van Dusen rationale,
on which the Ferens Court relied, 8 established three of these criteria.8 9 First, the Van Dusen Court stated that the recognized purpose
of section 1404(a) must be satisfied when determining which state's
law applies.9" Second, the Court sought to discourage forum-shop83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The rule set forth in Ferens will be referred to as the "movant-independent" rule, because
the Court chose to disregard who initiated the transfer in determining which state's law applies.
86. 110 S. Ct. at 1284-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612,
637 (1964); supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
87. The rule advocated by the Comment will be referred to as the "movant-dependent" rule,
because its determination of which state's law applies following a transfer depends upon who

initiates the transfer.
88. 110 S. Ct. at 1280, 1283-84; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
89. 376 U.S. 612; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
90. 376 U.S. at 635-37; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. The Court stated
that the purpose of section 1404(a) is to increase convenience in the federal courts. 376 U.S. at
636-37.
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ping.9 1 Third, the Court concluded that a choice of law rule under
section 1404(a) should not undermine the goal of uniformity between
state and federal courts within each state. 92 The Ferens Court added
that section 1404(a) choice of law rules should be administratively
practical.9 3
B.

The Conflict Between Ferens's Movant-Independent Rule and
the Van Dusen Rationale

The Ferens Court's holding that the law of the transferor court
applies following all section 1404(a) transfers does not comply with
the Van Dusen rationale, or with the Court's own additional concern
with the practical administration of justice. Although the Ferens
majority claimed that its holding was in accord with Van Dusen,94 the
Ferens decision will actually undermine Erie's goal of uniformity
between federal and state courts, decrease convenience in the federal
courts, and hinder the administration of choice of law rules.
The Movant-Independent Rule, Uniformity, and Forum-Shopping

L

The Ferens Court asserted that the movant-independent rule does
not violate Van Dusen's goal of uniformity or encourage forum-shopping by plaintiffs.95 The majority in Ferens concluded that plaintiffs
will not be able to engage in any extra forum-shopping as a result of
the Court's newly adopted rule, because the venue privilege already
gives plaintiffs the opportunity to select any available forum prior to
bringing suit.9 6 Common sense, however, indicates that the movantindependent rule will decrease uniformity by encouraging forum-shopping, because plaintiffs are no longer forced to balance convenience
with favorable law when selecting a forum.
Prior to the Ferens decision, the ability of plaintiffs to forum-shop
was somewhat circumscribed by the relative convenience of each available federal courtroom. Plaintiffs had to consider the convenience of a
particular forum along with the substantive law, because, under the
regime remaining after Van Dusen, many courts did not allow plain97
tiffs to transfer favorable law along with a transfer of the action.
Before Ferens, therefore, plaintiffs balanced their desire to forum-shop
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

376 U.S. at 636; see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 637; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
110 S. Ct at 1283-84; see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
110 S. Ct at 1280; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
110 S. Ct at 1280-1282; see also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
110 S. Ct. at 1282; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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with a competing desire to find a reasonably convenient, and ostensibly permanent, venue in which to litigate the action. Following Ferens, however, the Van Dusen restraints no longer exist, because section
1404(a) can now be used to secure the law of any "jurisdictionally
correct" forum, regardless of that forum's relative convenience."
Convenience need not figure into the pre-filing concerns of plaintiffs
given Ferens's implied sanction of the fie-and-transfer forum-shopping strategy. 99
Furthermore, plaintiffs need only seek those forums that have the
bare minimum of contacts necessary to obtain jurisdiction over the
defendant, but which have no other connection to the case. Section
1404(a)'s goal of increasing convenience ensures a later change of
venue. Any forum with minimum contacts and favorable law will now
be fair game for a section 1404(a) pit-stop. Plaintiffs are free to forumshop, secure in the knowledge that the Ferens decision will protect
their "legal booty" when they are truly ready to select a forum.'0 °
By converting section 1404(a) into a forum-shopping instrument,
the Ferens Court's application of the statute will decrease uniformity
between the federal and state courts within each state, contrary to the
reasoning underlying Van Dusen. 10 Following a plaintiff-initiated
change of venue, the transferee federal court will be forced to apply
the state law of the transferor court. Plaintiffs are thereby able to
achieve a result in federal court that they could not have obtained had
they originally filed the suit in a state court of the transferee state.
Contrary to the Ferens Court's claims, this result undermines Van
Dusen's goal of uniformity between the federal and state courts within
02
each state.1
2.

The Movant-Independent Rule and Convenience in the Federal
Courts

The Ferens Court stated that the application of the transferee state's
law would undermine convenience in the federal courts by forcing
98. 110 S. Ct. at 1280; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
99. See 110 S.Ct. at 1284.
100. The majority in Ferens argued that manipulation of section 1404(a) by forum-shopping
plaintiffs would be prevented by the fact that the statute does not provide for an automatic
change of venue. 110 S. Ct. at 1284. The Court reasoned that plaintiffs receive no guarantees
that an action will be transferred, and therefore should be hesitant to forum-shop. Id. As Justice
Scalia noted in his dissent, however, the only impact of the majority's "no-guarantee" reasoning
will be to encourage plaintiffs to select the most inconvenient favorable-law forum available, in
order to maximize the likelihood of a later transfer. Id. at 1288 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. See 376 U.S. at 635-39; see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
102. See 376 U.S. at 635-39; see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs to sacrifice convenience for favorable law. 10 3 In reality, however, the Court's concern for potential sacrifices by plaintiffs is misguided. The Court failed to recognize that this so-called sacrifice only
becomes necessary when plaintiffs are engaged in forum-shopping. If
plaintiffs are motivated solely by convenience, they will choose the
most convenient forum available prior to bringing suit. It is only
when plaintiffs are motivated by a desire to forum-shop that they are
"forced to choose" between convenience and favorable law. Therefore, the "sacrifice" that the majority seeks to prevent can actually be
prevented by plaintiffs themselves by basing their venue selections on
convenience rather than favorable law.
3.

The Movant-Independent Rule and Administrative Concerns in
the Federal Courts

Although the Ferens Court found that applying the law of the transferor court's state was the most practical rule from an administrative
point of view,"° the decision may well result in a logistical logjam in
the federal courts. As plaintiffs ride in and out of various forums
selecting favorable state laws to bring back to their ultimate choice of
courtrooms, federal courts with only the most tenuous connection to
an action will be forced to consume valuable resources ruling on transfer motions.105 The courts may be faced with a stream of motions to
change venue as forum-shopping begins to flourish. Although section
1404(a) will continue to offer relief to defendants in inconvenient
forums by giving them an opportunity to transfer to more hospitable
courtrooms, the statute will most likely find its greatest use among
forum-shopping plaintiffs. This result would prove quite ironic given
Van Dusen's statement that section 1404(a) was intended to promote
convenience in the federal court system, l "6 and Ferens's determination
that choice of law rules under the statute should be administratively

practical. 107
C. How Ferens Should Have Been Decided in Light of Van Dusen:
The Movant-Dependent Rule
Ferens could and should have been decided in accordance with the
Van Dusen Court's aim of forging a choice of law rule to promote
103. 110 S. CL at 1283; see also supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
104. 110 S. CL at 1283; see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
105. See 110 S. CL at 1287 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
106. 376 U.S. at 616; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
107. 110 S. CL at 1283; see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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convenience °8 and uniformity t°9 and to discourage forum-shopping,11 ° as well as with the Ferens Court's own concern with the practical administration of justice. 1 Specifically, the Ferens Court should
have developed the following "movant-dependent" rule: the law of the
transferor court's state applies following defendant- and court-initiated transfers, and the law of the transferee court's state applies following plaintiff-initiated transfers. Ferens's shortcomings arise
because the Court misapplied the reasoning behind Van Dusen when it
directly extrapolated the Van Dusen holding to cover plaintiff-initiated
transfers, contrary to Van Dusen's express limitation to defendant-ini1 12
tiated transfers.
1.

The Effect of the Movant-Dependent Rule on Uniformity and
Forum-Shopping

Although the Van Dusen Court limited its holding to defendantinitiated transfers, 1 3 the Court's uniformity rationale suggests that
following plaintiff-initiated transfers, the transferee court should apply
the law of the state in which the court sits. 1 14 Ferens, therefore, was
wrongly decided.
a. The Movant-Dependent Rule Prevents Litigants From Using
Section 1404(a) to Achieve Results in Federal Court that
Are Unavailable in a State Court Sitting in the
Same State
The Ferens Court directly extended Van Dusen's holding to plaintiff-initiated transfers without properly interpreting the rationale that
supported the Van Dusen decision.1 1 The Van Dusen Court found
that in order to achieve uniform application of state law, section
1404(a) must be applied so that a diverse litigant obtains no advantages unavailable to a non-diverse litigant.1 16 In Van Dusen's defendant-initiated transfer situation, this meant that the law of the
transferor state must follow defendants to the transferee forum.' 17 In
the case of a plaintiff-initiated transfer, however, the law of the trans108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

376 U.S. at 635-37; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 637; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 636; see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
110 S. Ct. at 1283; see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 640; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 640; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
376 U.S. at 640; see also supra text accompanying note 46.
376 U.S. 612; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 637-38; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. at 637-39; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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feree court must be applied in order to prevent plaintiffs from
obtaining a result in federal court that they could not have obtained in
a state court of the transferee forum. The movant-dependent rule,
therefore, complies with Van Dusen's application of section 1404(a)
and does not undermine uniformity between the federal and state
systems.
b.

The Movant-Dependent Rule DiscouragesForum-Shopping

Unlike the Ferens rule, the movant-dependent rule prevents plaintiffs from forum-shopping after they have filed suit in a particular
forum. If the Ferens Court had adopted the movant-dependent
approach, plaintiffs would be faced with choosing a forum based on
either convenience or favorable law. The resulting balancing of utility
against legal advantage would place a limit on plaintiffs' ability to
forum-shop using the venue privilege. Plaintiffs could still choose
venues based solely on their determination of which state offers the
most favorable law, and, given the venue privilege, plaintiffs could still
forum-shop before filing suit. If inconvenience proved too great after
the suit was filed, however, and plaintiffs then moved for transfer, they
would lose the favorable law.
This approach is supported by the Van Dusen decision, because it
neither expands nor contracts the plaintiffs' right to choose any proper
venue. The movant-dependent rule limits plaintiffs to a single, realistic venue selection rather than the two venue selections allowed under
Ferens. The proposed solution would therefore uphold Van Dusen's
goal of discouraging forum-shopping.
2.

The Movant-DependantRule and Section 1404(a) s Goal of
Increased Convenience

The movant-dependant rule does not undermine section 1404(a)'s
goal of convenience. The rule supports this goal by encouraging plaintiffs to fie initially in the venue where they ultimately want to try the
case. The movant-dependent rule, therefore, saves the parties and the
courts the inconvenience of the interim filing and transferring that
results from plaintiffs' forum-shopping under the Ferens Court's rule.
3.

The Movant-Dependent Rule and Fereus's Administrative

Concerns
Applying the law of the transferee forum following a plaintiff-initiated section 1404(a) transfer does not undermine Ferens's administrative concerns or section 1404(a)'s recognized aim of increasing judicial
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efficiency. In fact, the movant-dependent rule may actually increase
judicial efficiency, because it avoids the inefficiencies inherent in the
Ferens holding.1" Courts will not be forced to contend with transfer
motions that arise simply because forum-shopping plaintiffs are passing through the forum. The fact that the movant-dependent rule prevents misuse of the transfer statute by either party1 19 ensures that

those section 1404(a) motions that do come before the courts will be
based on a good faith desire to transfer the suits to more convenient
courtrooms, rather than a desire to forum-shop. Unlike the Ferens
rule, the movant-dependent rule promotes administrative efficiency in
the federal courts.
D.

Given That the Supreme Court Decided Ferens Wrongly, How
Can the Correct Result be Achieved?

Because the Ferens decision incorrectly determined which state's
law should apply following a plaintiff-initiated transfer, it is necessary
to consider how the holding can be corrected. There are at least three
potential means of achieving a proper result. First, the Supreme Court
may realize the disadvantages of the movant-independent rule and
reverse Ferens, a 5 to 4 decision, at its first opportunity. This, however, seems highly unlikely due to the Court's deference to stare decisis. Second, Congress could amend section 1404(a) to specify which
state's law applies after a change of venue, but this is also unlikely.
Finally, the lower federal courts could limit Ferens to its specific facts.
Neither the Ferens decision nor section 1404(a) prevents trial courts
from effectively determining which state's law applies on a case-bycase basis. In light of the fact that it could be implemented immediately, the case-by-case approach is the best method for solving the
problems caused by the Ferens decision.
1.

The Supreme Court Is Unlikely to Overrule Ferens

The Supreme Court may be presented with an opportunity to overrule Ferens. If the Ferens decision causes inefficiency and confusion in
the federal courts as suggested above,1 20 the Supreme Court may
reconsider its conclusion that the Ferens approach is the most practical method of applying section 1404(a). Given the Court's deference
118. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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to stare decisis, however, it seems unlikely that it would overrule Ferens unless the damage caused by the decision is extensive.121
2

Congress Could Amend Section 1404(a) to Specify Which State's
Law Applies Following a Transfer

The problems associated with section 1404(a) are in large part due
to incomplete drafting. 2 2 Therefore, Congress could correct the mistaken holding in Ferens, and complete the task of drafting section
1404(a) by amending the statute to stipulate that the transferee state's
law applies following defendant- or court-initiated transfers, and that
the transferor state's law applies following plaintiff-initiated transfers.
A congressional amendment offers the advantages inherent in the
legislative process. Congressional committees can study alternative
solutions and estimate their impact through testimony solicited from
judges and attorneys affected by the decision. The opportunity for
study and analysis that the legislative process offers would likely produce a fairly well-reasoned solution to the problem, such as the
movant-dependent rule suggested above.
This approach, however, has disadvantages. First, a legislative discussion of modifying section 1404(a) could become muddled by competing special interests. Trial attorneys interested in the prospect of
sanctioned forum-shopping may exert pressure on Congress to retain
the flawed reasoning of Ferens. Their demands could drown out support from other groups for increased convenience in the federal courts.
Furthermore, statutory solutions, like judicial solutions, have the
potential for misinterpretation in the lower courts. A congressional
solution may cause other unforeseen conflicts within the federal
courts.
3.

Lower Federal Courts Could Confine Ferens to its Facts And
Effectively Determine Which State's Law Applies on a
Case-by-Case Approach

The lower federal courts could offer an alternative solution to the
dilemma presented by Ferens. District courts could limit Ferens to its
121. The Court's composition has changed since the Ferens decision was handed down.
Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan on the Court in October 1990. It is unlikely, however,
that Justice Souter's presence will result in a different outcome should the Supreme Court
reconsider the application of section 1404(a), because Justice Brennan joined the dissent in
Ferens. During his tenure on the New Hampshire Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, Justice Souter did not address the issue of which state's law applies
following a section 1404(a) transfer.
122. See supro notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

867

Washington Law Review

Vol. 66:851, 1991

facts and achieve the practical result of the movant-dependent rule
through a case-by-case approach.' 2 3 The courts could utilize the internal mechanisms of section 1404(a) to take into account the relative
fairness of a transfer motion, and to specifically disallow any plaintiffinitiated transfer that is motivated by forum-shopping.
The "in the interest of justice" language of section 1404(a)"2 offers
an interesting guideline for a case-by-case approach to the problems
presented by Ferens. Courts have determined that a decision to grant
a transfer "in the interest of justice" lies within the broad discretion of
the trial court.' 2 5 This language could be interpreted to mean that the
court should consider the basic "fairness" of granting a change of
venue. The fact that a plaintiff brought suit in a forum for the sole
purpose of transferring the favorable law elsewhere could be one factor
that influences a determination of fairness.
Although this approach achieves a practical result different than
that contemplated by the Ferens Court, it does not violate the precedent established by the Supreme Court.' 2 6 Under this approach, Ferens's rule that the law of the transferor court apply following all
completed transfers could be maintained. Where the plaintiff is
engaged in forum-shopping, however, the transfer would not be
granted.
This case-by-case approach would prevent a conflict with the goal of
uniformity, because the statute could no longer easily be used to
forum-shop. Plaintiffs attempting to forum-shop would be faced with
the uncertainty of whether their motion to transfer would be granted.
This approach would encourage plaintiffs to be more careful in their
initial choice of forums and might reduce the overall number of transfer motions. The case-by-case approach would entrust the balancing
of section 1404(a) and uniformity concerns in individual cases to those
who are the most capable of reaching a just result: federal district
123. Ferens requires that district courts apply the law of the transferor court's state following
all section 1404(a) transfers, Limiting Ferens to its facts would mean addressing the goals of
convenience, efficiency, and uniformity prior to a transfer. See infra notes 125-27 and
accompanying text.
124. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1976); see also supra note 1.
125. See, eg., Goldsberry v. Ford Motor Co., 343 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (E.D. Wis. 1972); see
also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988).
126. In fact, the Court somewhat cryptically suggested just such a possibility when it stated,
"[n]o one has contested the justice of transferring this particular case, but the option remains
open to defendants in future cases." Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1284 (1990).
Ferens seems to suggest that defendants could challenge the justice of a transfer based on
plaintiffs' motivation for moving for that transfer. The dissent, however, dismissed the majority's
apparent suggestion as inconsistent with the reasoning behind the Court's holding. Il at 1288
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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court judges. Trial courts can assess the credibility of each party's
motivation for transferring a suit and stop forum-shopping at its
source.
Although the case-by-case approach is a possible alternative, it has
inherent disadvantages. Determining whether plaintiffs are forumshopping may be impractical.12 7 Requiring courts to rule on the legitimacy of plaintiffs' venue selections in each and every diversity action
adds entirely new and time-consuming evidentiary requirements to the
federal courts' already full dockets.' 28 Also, cases that are not transferred may cause inefficiency in the courts. Refusing to grant plaintiffs' motions to transfer based on a desire to "punish" the plaintiffs for
forum-shopping will mean that additional cases might be tried in less
than convenient forums. 2 9 This result is attenuated somewhat by the
ability of defendants and courts to initiate transfers, but in those cases
forum-shopping plaintiffs would again be rewarded with favorable
law. Also, the judicial process is limited to the case at hand. The
judiciary's inherently fact-dependant approach is more limited in
scope than the legislative process and, unless the problem is addressed
by the Supreme Court, is open to potential conflicts among the various
federal circuits. Finally, lack of predictability in the early application
of a case-by-case approach could prove extremely unfair to parties
who suddenly find themselves unable to transfer their claims.
4.

The Case-by-CaseApproach Is the Best Solution for Solving the
Problems Created by Ferens

The case-by-case approach is the best way to address the problems
raised by Feren& Although the case-by-case method has disadvantages, it is the most reasonable method for correcting Ferens. Trial
courts could immediately mitigate the potential damage resulting from
the flawed reasoning of Ferens by applying such an approach. While
some plaintiffs may be surprised by the suggested interpretation of section 1404(a), and some cases, therefore, may be litigated in less than
127. The majority in Ferens however, had no difficulty in determining that the plaintiffs were
engaged in forum-shopping. IM at 1278.
128. Courts already must consider the "technical" propriety of venue selections. The caseby-case approach, however, would force courts to consider the motivation of litigants along with
the mechanical aspects of the applicable venue statute.
129. This could occur where a plaintiff, relying on Ferens'sinvitation to forum-shop, files suit
in an inconvenient, albeit legally friendly, forum. The district court would be faced with a choice
of transferring the suit and, according to Ferens allowing the plaintiff to appropriate the
favorable law, or denying the transfer and decreasing judicial efficiency by litigating the suit in an
inconvenient forum.
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convenient forums, these problems should decrease as plaintiffs
become aware that district courts will not allow forum-shopping.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Ferens Court based its decision to apply the law of the transferor court's state following all section 1404(a) transfers on the mistaken belief that it was the most practical way to apply section 1404(a)
so as to encourage uniformity and discourage forum-shopping. The
Ferens rule is not a workable method for applying the federal transfer
statute, however. In fact, Ferens turns section 1404(a) into a forumshopping instrument that undermines uniformity and convenience in
the federal courts.
A more attractive approach to balancing section 1404(a) with the
goals of encouraging uniformity and discouraging forum-shopping is
to follow the rationale of the Van Dusen Court and apply the law of
the transferee court's state following plaintiff-initiated transfers. This
approach avoids the problem of using section 1404(a) as a forum-shopping device and promotes greater uniformity than the approach utilized in Ferens. The Van Dusen rationale supports a system that
prevents litigants in diversity cases from using section 1404(a) to
achieve a result in federal court that is unavailable in a state court
sitting in the same state.
Although the Ferens decision could be overruled by Congress or the
Supreme Court, the case-by-case approach is the best way of correcting the decision's defects. Federal courts should consider plaintiffs' motivation in requesting transfers under section 1404(a). If the
court determines that a transfer request is motivated by forum-shopping, the plaintiff's motion should be denied. If, however, the request
is motivated solely by convenience considerations, then the motion
should be granted and Ferens's rule that the law of the transferor
court applies in the more convenient forum should be respected. The
case-by-case approach would promote the goals of Erie, Van Dusen
and Ferens by encouraging convenience and uniformity, and by discouraging forum-shopping.
Michael B. Rodden
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